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Spain has overtaken the European Union in regulating artificial intelligence in the
employment field. While the EU set the base for the regulation of algorithms with the
Proposal for a Regulation on artificial intelligence (PAIR), the norm is not expected to
be applicable until, foreseeably, at least 2023. On 11 May, however, Spain passed a
new provision that regulates algorithmic transparency in the employment field. This
new norm gives workers the right to be informed about the parameters, rules and
instructions via which algorithms or artificial intelligence (AI) systems impact their
working conditions and determine access to employment.
The provision, for its novelty, appears to be ambitious at first sight. However, this
may be only a first step. Its potential limitations and practical consequences will
determine the extent to which it will effectively be able to aid workers to tackle the
algorithmic conundrum in employment.
The law: What is it and where does it come from?
The provision is ground-breaking, as it is the first attempt by any European State
to regulate algorithmic transparency in the employment field. It is also, however, a
limited norm that will need to be developed in the future in order to achieve its goal:
to provide workers a certain degree of control over the AI systems that affect them.
The provision states that:
“[The Council of Workers [of a company] shall have the right, at the appropriate
interval, to:]
Be informed by the company of the parameters, rules, and instructions on which
algorithms or artificial intelligence systems that affect any decision-making that may
have an impact on working conditions, access to and maintenance of employment
are based, including profiling.“
The Decree that implemented this new provision was initially developed to establish
a presumption that delivery workers are not self-employed but employees. Case
law had repeatedly concluded so, and the matter ended in the Spanish Supreme
Court in a case against Glovo. Although this presumption only makes reference to
riders (“people who work on delivery and distribution”), the door is most likely open to
applying the same logic to other digital platform workers, if any similar case is taken
to court.
The social debate that led to this change of legislation has its roots in the flourishing
of the gig economy. It promised a new and flexible employment model that would
bestow upon workers control over their work-life. This could have been possible in a
context where workers are valued as individuals with specific skills. However, when
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workers are valued only as an interchangeable part of the production chain, flexibility
turns into temporality, instability and precariousness.
On these new digital platforms, as well as in big companies in which workforce is
mainly hired for basic and repetitive tasks, such as Amazon, workers are deprived of
their inherent human worth and are treated as robots. Worse, they may themselves
be controlled by robots: automated systems now decide over the fate and conditions
of workers without taking into account any human factor. Workers are, in addition,
considered to be self-employed, so risks, costs, and downfalls of the activity are
borne by them, while they are deprived of even their most basic labour rights. They
have no protection against irregular dismissals or in case of a work accident. Should
a worker have any kind of problem that prevented them from reaching the minimum
rate imposed by the system, or a misunderstanding with a client, they could see
their job terminated, as the platform would just kick them out, without any chance of
explaining themselves or challenging the decision.
How does AI affect workers in practice?
The necessity of the new provision is underscored by sprouting examples of
algorithmic effects on workers. In the UK, several workers from the Postal Service
lost their jobs – and worse – due to a mistake in an artificial intelligence system,
that falsely determined that they had stolen money from the company. In the
Netherlands, Uber drivers sued the company after an algorithm suspended their
accounts for allegedly committing fraud. The Court rejected their claim, as it was
not considered to be fully automated decision-making under the GDPR (General
Data Protection Regulation). In effect, workers were left without any protection.
Contrastively, in Italy, a court ordered Deliveroo to disclose their algorithm and to
supress the elements that made it discriminatory, since it did not take into account
factors regulated in the employment law, such as sick leaves or strike rights.
In a different manner, Amazon workers – both warehouse and delivery workers
– are also affected by algorithms, since scoring systems determine and control
the performance rate they are required to achieve, which drives them to a state of
perpetual anxiety and fear. Human needs and conditions are, of course, not taken
into account by the system. Workers are not able go to the bathroom if they want to
meet the system’s demands (not even women on their periods).
Present prospects and future consequences
Advances in algorithmic regulation may help tackle the whole problem. The Spanish
Ministry of Employment announced that the new norm seeks to make algorithms
serve the workers, and ensure that they take into account not only business
objectives, but also human and labour rights. Towards this end, the norm aims to
provide workers with control over otherwise obscure mechanisms that may affect
their working conditions or the employment relationship itself, and to allow them to
act when algorithms do not take into consideration the obligations that the labour law
imposes on employers.
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However, all that glitters is not gold. The norm does not provide any mechanism
to effectively exercise any control over the algorithm, but only bestows a right to
information on how workers are affected. Information is the first step to achieve
control, but next steps are missing.
What action workers can take against the company if the algorithm proves to be
harmful is not clear. Regular legal redress against, for example, discrimination or
non-compliance with employment rights looks like the most feasible option. However,
the lack of clarity invites uncertainty on how the requirements and conditions will be
interpreted, and how the norm will be enforced in practice.
Additionally, it is not workers themselves who are entitled to the right, but the Council
of Workers in a company – it is a collective right. However, such Councils only
exist in companies or workplaces with 50 or more workers, and hence, smaller
companies remain unprotected. Furthermore, the Council has a duty of secrecy and
confidentiality on the information they receive from the company, and cannot use it
for different purposes, which may pose an important disadvantage for public debate
and hinder research on the matter.
On the one hand, leaving such an important right in the hands of a Council rather
than directly on workers’ hands leaves margin to problems that may prevent the
adequate exercise of the right. On the other hand, the fact that the Council of
Workers is entitled to exercise the legal defence of workers may be beneficial:
algorithmic systems affect a big number of workers, so collective action seems a
better option than individual action. But the central challenge remains: it is unclear
how the information obligation towards the Councils will work in reality. Firstly,
because the norm obliges the company to provide information periodically, but does
not provide a defined period. Similar provisions on rights to information mention
6-month and yearly intervals, which seem like very long times compared to the
speed at which technology advances. Secondly, because the norm does not further
specify or define any of the elements that it mentions – although its ultimate intention
appears to be clear enough for interpretation.
How will the provision be developed?
Leaving practical application open to interpretation may be dangerous. In Germany,
where algorithmic transparency for credit scoring was implemented, courts settled on
a very basic right that only included the general logic behind the algorithm and the
description of the parameters used, while considering the algorithm a trade secret
that could not be further disclosed. This resulted in a limited information right that
was not useful in practice, as the subject had no possibility of really getting to know
the functioning of the algorithm and how it had reached its conclusions.
The Spanish Government intends to create an expert group to analyse algorithmic
and AI effects in employment, seeking to “move towards a fair and rights-based
technology transition”, in their own words. Fortunately, this seems to mean that
the shortcomings of the provision will be solved. In this sense, one of the biggest
Spanish Unions has already suggested to broaden the scope and conditions of
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the new norm, creating an algorithm register, a wider explainability right, a liability
system, and audit rights – similarly to the provisions of the new EU-level PAIR. This
could even be directly applied when the AI Regulation comes into force, as the PAIR
labels systems that are “intended to be used for making decisions on promotion
and termination of work-related contractual relationships, for task allocation and
for monitoring and evaluating performance and behaviour of persons in such
relationships” as high-risk systems, that are subject to a broad scope of obligations,
including transparency, requirements for data training, and explainability.
How does all this relate to EU law?
Although coinciding with the PAIR, it does not look like the Spanish lawmaker was
inspired by it. No reference was made to the proposal, to the European landscape
or debate. However, some similarities can be found – unsurprisingly, since the EU
proposal likewise reflects the public and academic debate of the past few years.
Overarchingly, the new Spanish right interlinks with existing EU law, and can be
strengthened by it. Foremost, an additional protection mechanism can be drawn
from Article 22 GDPR, which grants a right to oppose automated decision-making
when it has a legal or similar effect on a subject whose personal data are used for
the processing. The GDPR also allows Member States to broaden such protection,
which has been proven to be insufficient in the employment field. In the same way,
national norms could be developed to introduce some of the requirements from the
PAIR before the it is enacted and enters into force.
Even if the new Spanish right may resemble Article 22 GDPR, the GDPR bestows
an individual, partly limited right, as opposed to the broader, collective right to
information now recognized in Spain. Notwithstanding, given the lack of a redress
mechanism, Article 22 GDPR may be an instrument to stop the processing of
workers’ data, following the information provided by the company.
However, this method may be insufficient in relationships with two unequal sides,
where the employer holds power vis-à-vis the worker. This is even more blatant on
big platforms such as Uber or Amazon, where workers are dispensable. In the latter
case, the employer does not merely wield power but absolute power, reinforced by
intense control and surveillance, facilitated by AI systems aimed at subduing and
extracting the last bit of performance from the worker.
Just a first step
The only way of rebalancing the scale is by protecting workers from algorithmic
influence. Information rights on the functioning of such systems, as now provided by
Spanish law, are key. They are, however, just a first step. Additional and targeted
mechanisms that take into account the nature and particularities of these systems
are required. Hopefully, this recent legislative change will just be a first stone for
a path that will continue to be built by courts, if they chose to interpret the norm
by its intention and not by what it lacks, and by lawmakers, that may continue to
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develop this ground-breaking provision along with the to-be new European Artificial
Intelligence Regulation.
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